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THE DEGREE OF DEFENDANT'S FAULT AS AFFECTING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW OF EXCESSIVE
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES *
RALPH S. BAUER t
Is there a notable tendency in courts, in the administration of the rule
that compensatory damages must not be excessive, to allow larger compen-
satory damages against the defendant who has done a wrong either wilfully
or recklessly than against one who has acted with mere negligence? Does
the likelihood that a very large verdict will be set aside as excessive vary
in inverse ratio to the degree of moral fault of the defendant? Is a court
usually ready to sustain a verdict for very large compensatory damages
against a wilful or reckless wrongdoer and somewhat less ready to sustain
a similar verdict against a merely negligent wrongdoer? These questions
we shall try to answer by a study of cases.
It would, of course, be unreasonable to argue that compensatory dam-
ages, where they are absolutely certain in amount and completely incapable
of any plausible stretching by the jury, could ever be lawfully stretched
into greater compensatory damages by reason of even the greatest fault.
For instance, if the defendant has destroyed the plaintiff's case of eggs,
according to all the evidence worth exactly $9.02, no kind of legerdemain
by the jury, winked at by a complacent trial judge, can enlarge the compen-
satory damages to an amount greater than $9.02 for the direct damage done
by the destruction of plaintiff's property. Theoretically, perhaps this is
always true as to compensatory damages.
But, actually, even compensatory damages have often been at large,
practically in the discretion of the jury except for a very slight control by
the court, where the amount of actual damage is difficult to ascertain. Com-
pensatory damages in personal injury cases usually include damages for a
number of items that are completely impossible to evaluate at any certain
figure. Physical pain and mental suffering are not capable of any definitely
*This is a sequel, so to speak, to the article, The Dcgree of Moral Fault as Affecting
Defendant's Liability (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 586, which treated fault as affecting
liability in general, with special attention to the principles of certainty and causation. The
present article leaves out of consideration the principle of exemplary damages, just as far
as this is possible, that is, everything named exemplary damages is omitted. Of course it is
fully realized that, in actuality, there is not always a complete severing of the compensatory
and the exemplary. Exactly as in the days before exemplary damages were given judicial
recognition in name, courts and juries today frequently allow exemplary damages under
the name of compensatory damages, and it is believed that this is one thing indicated by a
number of the cases cited.
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accurate appraisals. Damage suffered through loss of earning power,
though not so indefinite in amount as physical pain and mental suffering,
is a matter on which greatly varying conclusions might be reached without
appearance of any probable error, and therefore a large stretching-upward
of compensatory damages for earning power, if not so large as to seem
rather striking, may easily pass without the court's notice. Likewise, in
cases of interference with the business of plaintiff by defendant, whether
it be a malicious interference in violation of rules of common law,
or a violation of anti-trust statutes, or infringement of patents or copy-
rights, there may be instances presented in which the damage done is rather
manifestly large but impossible- to compute with accuracy, and this fact, as
we shall see, has tended toward the judicial approval of very large verdicts
for wilful injury to business, whether the action is brought under the com-
mon law or under statutes, and whether large damages are strictly proved
or not.
Usually, the question of moral fault is not dragged into the open by
the court in disposing of questions of merely compensatory damages; and
yet, in some instances, there has been a frank discussion of defendant's
fault. One court said: "If the damages seem large, they are not, so far
as we are permitted to judge, out of proportion to the fault." 1
Even in contract, it seems that degree of fault figures in the adminis-
tration of the rules of certainty and causation.2  It appears that the degree
of fault of the contract-breaker is likely to affect the settlement of the ques-
tion of allowance of large compensatory damages.
3
'Severens, J., in Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. v. Lillard, i6o Fed. 34, 40
(C. C. A. 6th, i9o8).
"While defendant is without moral fault with respect to this delay, plaintiff is equally
innocent; and it need not be said that, as between the parties before us, contract rights and
liabilities must govern." Knappen, J., in South Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood
Lumber Co., 21o Fed. 257, 262 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914).
2 On the kind of judicial treatment accorded wilful breakers of contracts in the adminis-
tration of the rule of certainty of proof, see article referred to supra note *, at 592 n. 17.
'An action was brought on the contract for the sale of distillery slops for feeding. The
contract provided that plaintiff, a distillery company, would sell and deliver, and that de-
fendants would purchase, receive, and accept the slops at a feeding lot leased by defendants
to plaintiff, where defendants should have the privilege of using the necessary troughs and
tubs which plaintiff was to place and connect in a manner suitable for feeding. Plaintiff
broke its contract by failing to furnish a sufficient number of troughs and tubs, in conse-
quence of which 67 of defendants' cattle died of starvation, and 1,340 failed to fatten to the
extent that they might reasonably have been expected to fatten. Judgment was affirmed on
a verdict for defendants in the sum of $7,ooo and costs. The court said: "From the testi-
mony shown in the record, we think the jury might have given the defendants a larger
verdict than they did. And the damages were not remote. They were the natural and
probable result of conditions for which the plaintiff was responsible. If the damages seem
large, they are not, so far as we are permitted to judge, out of proportion to the fault."
Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. v. Lillard, supra note I, at 40. If the court had
regarded the moral fault of the plaintiff as being not very serious, would the court thus
lightly have held the plaintiff liable for such a consequence as the death by starvation of
67 of defendants' cattle, an unusual consequence and more than possibly one shown by the
record to be avoidable? The court seems to be impressed with the greatness of the fault of
plaintiff.
FAULT AS AFFECTING DAMAGES
In cases of wilful tort, there is a considerable number of instances in
which verdicts for questionably large damages have been allowed to stand,
without any mention of exemplary damages. In such cases, it would seem
that the courts have affirmed judgments on large verdicts, with somewhat
less hesitancy than would have existed if the defendant had been guilty of
mere negligence. Cases of assault and battery and of false imprisonment
afford excellent examples of this tendency.4 A distinction between the wilful
Defendants made a rather vague promise to plaintiff, in purchasing land of plaintiff,
that they would build thereon "a good steam saw-mill". Despite the uncertainty as to what
kind of mill was to be built, the court affirmed judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $5oo.
Not all of the facts are made clear by the report, but it seems to be a case of flagrant breach
of contract. Fraley v. Bentley, i Dak. 25, 46 N. W. 5o6 (1874).
Cochran v. People's Ry., 131 Mo. 607, 33 S. W. 177 (1895), is a case in which de-
fendant was allowed to recover, on a counterclaim, only $ioo, the amount allowed by the
verdict, although all witnesses estimated the damage to woodwork, due to plaintiff's failure
to roof the building for defendant promptly, at $32o. It seems that plaintiff had been rather
unfortunate in attempts to build for defendant, bad weather hindering him. The trial court
erroneously admitted evidence of such bad weather, which was irrelevant, as the terms of
the contract made no provision against bad weather. The court was probably influenced,
in allowing the verdict to stand, by the fact that it did not regard plaintiff as being morally
at fault in the breach of his contract.
'Defendants took plaintiff to a field, stripped and severely beat him, and forced him to
leave home. Held, that a verdict for $4,000 is not excessive. The court said: "Finally, it
is contended by the appellants that the damages assessed by the jury are excessive. We do
not agree with this contention. The assault and battery charged and proven at the trial was
of an aggravated character; and the jury, who heard the evidence, and had the parties and
witnesses before it, were the best judges of the amount necessary to compensate the appellee
for the injuries he had received at the hands of the appellants." As far as we can judge
from the report of the case, it seems unlikely that $4,ooo compensatory damages would have
been allowed for similar injuries in the same year in a negligence case. Morgan v. Kendall,
124 Ind. 454, 463, 24 N. E. 143, 146 (189o).
In Duer v. Gagnon, 129 Minn. 517, 152 N. W. 88o (1915), plaintiff sued defendant for
assault and battery. Plaintiff was confined to a hospital for about 14 weeks, suffered
much pain, was put to considerable expense, and was on crutches at the time of the trial,
from the facture of the larger bone in his right leg. Judgment for plaintiff for $I,goo was
affirmed. The court said, at 519, 152 N. W. at 881: "Under the circumstances, we cannot
say that the damages are excessive or that the jury was influenced by prejudice or passion."
The court seems to stress "the circumstances", implying that they affect the question of
excessive damages, without mentioning exemplary damages.
Cummins v. Crawford, 88 Ill. 312 (1878), was a case of trespass for shooting and
wounding of plaintiff by defendant. Judgment for plaintiff, in the sum of $I,95o, was
affirmed. The shooting was with a double-barrelled shot-gun. One barrel was loaded with
powder and leaden ball, and the other with powder and small "turkey shot" or "small buck
shot". The one first discharged was the rifle ball, which took effect in plaintiff's left breast,
passing through a part of the lungs and coming out near the shoulder blade, and the shot
from the other barrel took effect in his leg. The wounds were such as might disable him
for life. The issue of exemplary damages does not appear to have been raised at all; but
the court said, at 319: "The injuries inflicted upon plaintiff are serious-such as may
disable him for life; and the damages found are not excessive. Besides, the assault was
wanton, and the circumstances proven would warrant the jury in imposing upon defendant
a measure of punishment as exemplary damages. The law distinguishes between injuries
inflicted under influences of sudden passion and such as are planned and executed with
deliberation. In this case, defendant was moved by no sudden impulse, but waited calmly
until his adversary advanced near enough, and then shot him, with a matured purpose to
kill him. Such deliberation is seldom witnessed Tn the commission of acts of violence."
In Royer v. Belcher, ioo W. Va. 694, 131 S. E. 556 (1926), judgment on the verdict
of $25o in favor of plaintiff was affirmed. Plaintiff had to expend about $5o as a result of
the battery by defendant. The court said, at 697, 131 S. E. at 557: "The actual damages
to which he was entitled included not only his monetary outlay, but damages for his physical
injuries, pain, and humiliation. Would a less sum than $25o compensate him for his actual
damages? Unless we can so determine, we cannot hold that any punitive damages are
included in the verdict."
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and the mistaken taking of minerals from land of the plaintiff is openly and
directly recognized and well known to the legal profession, a much more
severe measure of damages prevailing against the wilful wrongdoer.'
The examination of a considerable number of cases of personal injuries,
nearly all decided in recent years, each involving a verdict of $20,000 or
more, selected in a uniform manner and without any intention to influence
the result of this investigation, indicates that, under similar or at least fairly
comparable circumstances, the chance of getting judgment affirmed on a
verdict of $20,000 or more, or at least keeping it from being reduced below
$20,000, is roughly twice as great in cases of reckless misconduct as it is
in cases of mere negligence. A similar examination indicates that the chance
of getting a verdict of $20,000 or more reduced to a point under $20,000 is
roughly twice as great in negligence cases as it is in those of reckless mis-
conduct.
Of course we must not ignore the fact that the actual amount of damage
suffered in some of these cases governs the case, without the necessity of
giving any attention to degree of fault. Theoretically, this would regularly
One. case in which it might seem that the idea of approving very large verdicts for
compensatory damages in cases based upon assault and battery is carried too far, is the
well known case of Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, io4 N. W. 12 (905). Defendant, a
surgeon, had placed plaintiff under an anaesthetic, for the purpose of operating upon her
left ear, in accordance with plaintiff's consent. A close examination revealed that an opera-
tion on the left ear was unnecessary. Defendant examined the right ear and found that
there existed in it conditions that presented serious dangers to plaintiff's health in the
future. Therefore defendant operated on the right ear. It was admitted that the operation
was skillfully performed and of a beneficial nature. Yet the trial court gave judgment on
a verdict for $14,000, which was affirmed on appeal. Evidently the court was willing to
allow a much larger verdict to stand than would have been allowed in a negligence case on
any facts closely resembling those in this case. This seems a perversion of the general
tendency to allow greater compensatory damages where the fault is great, as the mere fact
that the defendant's act happens to constitute technically an assault and battery should not
becloud the fact that he is guilty of very little moral fault, if any. Certainly a great many
persons today, and many of the courts, would gladly approve what the defendant did in
this instance as a strictly moral, as well as legal, act of the surgeon under the circum-
stances, the implication of consent existing in at least some of the states.
Cordell v. Standard Oil Co., 131 Kan. 221, 289 Pac. 472 (i93o), was a case in which
defendant's agent at a gasoline filling-station wrongfully detained plaintiff, a woman, while
defendant's agent informed police that she was a felon or a part of the forerunner of a
robbery. Plaintiff had a verdict of $5oo, on which the trial court gave judgment, which
was affirmed. No question of exemplary damages was involved. The tort here is one
classified by the law as wilful, as contrasted with negligent, although the motive may have
been honest. The judgment here was for a large amount, when it is compared with the
amount of damage evidently done.
A, by mistake, takes minerals from B's land. The measure of damages in either trover
or trespass is ordinarily held to be the value of the minerals in place in the land. "Where
the defendant's conduct, measured by the standard of ordinary morality and care, which is
the standard of the law, is not chargeable with fraud, violence, or wilful negligence or
wrong, the value of the property taken and converted is the measure of just compensation.
If raw material has, after appropriations and without such wrong, been changed by manu-
facture into a new species of property, as grain into whiskey, grapes into wine, furs into
hats, hides into leather, or trees into lumber, the law either refuses the action of trover for
the new article, or limits the recovery to the value of the original article. . . . Where
there is no wrongful purpose or wrongful negligence in the defendant, compensation for the
real injury done is the purpose of all remedies; and so long as we bear this in mind, we
shall have but little difficulty in managing the form of action so as to secure a fair result."
Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 29I, 296 (i861).
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be so, and, actually, the affirmance of judgment on a large verdict is often
completely explicable on the ground of large damage actually suffered, just
as the reversal of judgment on a large verdict may often be explained by
the smallness of the actual damage. In some of the reported cases, the
amount of damage is hard to ascertain, by reason of the meagerness of the
facts stated, and, in some instances, the character and degree of the fault
of the defendant are, for the same reason, difficult or impossible to learn.
This makes a satisfactory examination of some of the cases difficult and
fated to produce only somewhat obscure results, although the study of some
other cases affords a sufficient yield of good data to make for results genu-
inely indicative of judicial tendencies.
Certain very dangerous railroading practices, probably only rarely in-
dulged in, have more or less dearly amounted to reckless misconduct, and
some interesting cases, terminating in the affirmance of judgments on very
large verdicts, have resulted. Running a train on a wrong track may con-
stitute reckless misconduct. A very clear case of reckless misconduct is
Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. R. v. Holland,0 in which defendant's em-
ployees, in violation of the express rules of the Rock Island Railroad, on
which plaintiff was a conductor, placed defendant's train on the Rock Island
track, wilfully taking the chance of a collision, upon the occurrence of
which plaintiff was severely and permanently injured. A verdict for $25,000
was held not excessive.
Almost as reckless is the case in which a railroad company has wilfully
taken the chances naturally resulting from leaving a switch open. Such a
case is Andrews v. Wilding,7 in which plaintiff, an employee on defendant's
railroad, was badly injured in a wreck caused by an open switch without
lock or light. A verdict for $22,ooo was held not excessive.
In Spencer v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.,8 the court upheld a verdict
for $22,500, to which sum it had been reduced by the trial court from
$30,000. Plaintiff, forty-two years old, a brakeman-collector of defendant,
was injured by reason of a switch left open. He had practically lost the
use of a leg. Probably the leaving of the switch open would be considered
reckless misconduct.
Running a railroad train, on a dark night, without a headlight, may
well be treated as reckless misconduct. In Savage v. Chicago, etc. Ry., '
plaintiff was struck by defendant's locomotive, which bore no headlight,
0I8 Ill. App. 418 (1886), aff'd, 122 Ill. 461, 13 N. E. 145 (1887). In Hall v. Chicago,
etc. R. R., 46 Minn. 439, 49 N. W. 239 (I8gi), the reckless misconduct is obvious. Plaintiff,
defendant's engineer, on a passenger train, was badly injured by a collision of his train
with freight cars which a switching crew ran on the main track, in violation of rules of the
company. A verdict for $25,ooo was held not excessive.
7 193 S. W. 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
8249 Ill. App. 463 (1928).
0328 Mo. 44, 40 S. W. (2d) 628 (1931).
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although the night was very dark. Plaintiff was forty-six years old, earning
between $154 and $191 per month. He lost two fingers, and his right hand
and arm were rendered practically useless, his skull was fractured, causing
pressure on the brain, and he suffered dizzy spells, nervousness and loss of
control; in addition, there was evidence that he would grow worse. A verdict
for $20,000 was held not excessive.
Under some conditions, undoubtedly it constitutes reckless misconduct
for a railroad train to approach a grade crossing without any warning. A
case involving such conduct is Rainey v. Missouri Pacific R. R.,' ° in which
plaintiff suffered cuts and bruises, dislocated and broken collar bone, broken
nose, fractured skull, ruptured blood vessel in the brain, unconsciousness for
ten days, sojourn in hospital for twenty-five days, medical expenses of
$675, and partial and progressive paralysis. A verdict for $25,000 was held
not excessive. Defendant's train, proceeding at forty or fifty miles an hour,
through a village, across a street from which plaintiff could not see it until
within five or ten feet of the track, struck plaintiff, who was driving an auto-
mobile. The train neither rang a bell nor blew a whistle within a quarter-
mile of the crossing. The facts seem to indicate a wilful taking of a chance-
reckless misconduct.
It seems a fairly clear case of reckless misconduct to carry on a con-
struction train a bar of iron projecting five or six feet in a slanting direction
in such a manner as to strike a passenger train coming on the other track
from the opposite direction, severely injuring plaintiff, who was riding as a
passenger thereon.-- The affirmance of judgment on a large verdict in such
a case is in line with the usual practice.
In Dieffenbach v. New York, etc. R. R.,':' the facts as to the collision
producing plaintiff's injury are meager. Plaintiff, a passenger in a sleeping
car, was severely injured, when a train of defendant crashed into the car,
demolishing it. This is probably a case of reckless misconduct, as such col-
lisions are usually produced only by lack of or disregard of signals.
In Louisville, etc. R. R. v. Mitchell,'3 because he was given erroneous
information as to train schedule, plaintiff, a conductor, had his work train
on the main track, where it was struck by another of defendant's trains,
injuring plaintiff. May not the giving of erroneous information to a con-
ductor as to the movement of trains on his line be said to be reckless mis-
conduct? Before giving information to the conductor, the despatcher should
10323 Mo. 662, 21 S. W. (2d) 873 (I929), certiorari denied, 28o U. S. 614, 50 Sup. Ct.
162 (1929).
'Walker v. Erie Ry., 63 Barb. 26o (N. Y. 1872).
'5 App. Div. 9I, 38 N. Y. Supp. 788 (I896).
i173 Ky. 622, 191 S. W. 465 (1917). Does not the giving of such information in
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity compare with the recklessness of accountants, of
which Cardozo, C. J., speaks in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174
N. E. 441 (1931) ? Is it not even more serious, as it affects the safety of human lives, and
not merely the conservation of financial interests?
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have examined his schedule and ascertained that the information given was
correct. It would seem that the giving of such information without care-
fully checking, where human lives are at stake, may well be regarded as
more than mere negligence.
A somewhat similar case is International, etc. R. R. v. Vanlandingham,
14
wherein plaintiff, defendant's locomotive engineer, a stranger to the road,
was not supplied with a time-card. Consequently he ran his train into cars
standing on the main track, and was badly injured. Defendant was found
negligent in having freight cars on its main line and in not protecting with
a flagman the train on which plaintiff was engineer. This is seemingly
a case of reckless misconduct.
In Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Dixon,1" plaintiff, a thirty-seven-year-old
railroad section man, suffered loss of a leg below the knee, injuries to the
coccyx and pelvis, and complete loss of earning power. He continued to
require constant personal attention. A verdict for $2o,ooo was held not
excessive. Defendant's employees, in producing the collision in which plain-
tiff was injured, committed what was rather clearly reckless misconduct, in
proceeding without flag protection under conditions making such protection
imperative.
In Wilson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,"' plaintiff, a conductor, was
badly injured, and was rendered a helpless cripple, the cause of his injury
being the construction of tracks too close together. A verdict for $45,000
was upheld. May it not be said that the construction of tracks so close
together as very obviously to make the work of railroad trainmen on such
tracks unsafe is reckless misconduct? It seems to be the wilful taking of
a chance of causing death or serious personal injuries.
In St. Louis, etc. Ry. v. Coke,17 plaintiff, a conductor, was severely
injured by the collapse of a defective bridge under his train. There was some
evidence from which it could be inferred that the defendant was guilty of
reckless misconduct as to the manner of building or maintenance. A verdict
for $25,000 was upheld.
Recklessly going ahead and striking a person plainly visible and at a
considerable distance when first seen seems to be a quality of conduct that
naturally incurs the resentment of courts as well as of juries. An instance
of a large verdict for injuries so caused is Nagi v. Detroit United Ry.,' s
'38 Tex. Civ. App. 206, 85 S. W. 847 (i9o5).
'218 Ky. 84, 290 S. W. io64 (927). See facts in first report of same case, 212 Ky.
738, 80 S. W. 93 (1926).
I i94 Ill. App. 49i (1915). In Westover v. Wabash Ry., 6 S. W. (2d) 843 (Mo.
1928), certiorari denied, 278 U. S. 632, 49 Sup. Ct. 31 (1928), plaintiff, a 35-year-old
switchman, lost his right hand and lower fourth of right forearm and toes and tips of
metatarsal bones of left foot, by being knocked from an engine step to a point beneath the
engine by a switch stand located too near the track. The verdict was reduced from $3oooo
to $22,500. It seems a case of reckless misconduct.
Jix8 .Ark. 49, 175 S. W. 1177 (915).
"231 Mich. 452, 2o4 N. W. 126 (x925).
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in which plaintiff, in a stalled automobile, was struck by defendant's electric
car, although the motorman could have seen plaintiff's automobile two and
one-half or three blocks away. Plaintiff's hands were injured, both arms
were broken, his left leg was crushed, with stiffening of the knee, part of his
nose was lost, his upper jaw-bone was broken, his power of chewing was
impaired, he had to walk on crutches for sixteen months, and with a cane
for five months. He was kept from work for nearly two and one-half years.
He was thirty-three years old, earning $6 per day plus a bonus of $io a
month if he worked thirty days. Plaintiff's money loss up to the time of
the trial was $6400. Judgment was reduced from $30,000 to $21,000. It
was a very clear case of reckless misconduct.
Very similar in quality of conduct is any case in which defendant's
electric car is run across a street intersection at high speed without keeping
a lookout. Such a case is Bennett v. Central California Traction Co.,19
in which plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old girl, received the following injuries,
when the automobile in which she was riding was struck by defendant's
street car: lower jaw-bone broken in three places, chin-bone splintered, two
teeth driven into upper jaw-bone, inability for a long time to chew food,
defect in vision preventing the use of the eyes for reading or work, and
such injury to the face as to render it hardly recognizable. A verdict for
$25,000 was held not excessive. The facts seems to indicate reckless mis-
conduct.
In Griswold v. Chicago Railways Co.,20 plaintiff, a woman fifty years
old, was so badly injured as to be confined to the hospital for over seven
months, during six months of which time her legs and body were in steel
and wooden casts and splints, and thereafter she had to walk on crutches
and continued to suffer pain. Her injuries resulted in high blood pressure,
apoplexy, and paralysis of one side of the body, from which she partly
recovered. It was held that a verdict for $25,ooo was not excessive. The
case seems to be on the border-line between negligence and reckless miscon-
duct. Defendant's conductor caused the street car to start when plaintiff
and other passengers had just alighted and had not had time or opportunity
to pass out of the reach of the overhanging rear of the car, which, as the
conductor must have understood it would do, struck the plaintiff, as the car
9 I P. (2d) 47 (Cal. App. 1931). In Hart v. Farris, 13 P. (2d) 790 (Cal. App. 1932),
one of defendants was driving an automobile at night, when he struck and injured
plaintiff, a woman, who was riding a bicycle. Defendant could have seen plaintiff at a
distance of 300 feet, by his headlights, if he had been keeping a careful lookout. There was
some evidence that defendant was exceeding the legal speed limit. Plaintiff, who was 41
years old, suffered fractures of 4 ribs and I vertebra, and also lacerations of the scalp,
contusions of the liver, and heart trouble. Her activities would be greatly limited. Judg-
ment on a verdict for $2o,ooo was affirmed. High speed and failure to keep a lookout
would seem to be sufficient to constitute reckless misconduct.
20253 Ill. App. 498 (1929).
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began to turn the corner. It seems fair to treat this case as one of reckless
misconduct.
The reckless driving of motor cars on highways has sometimes given
rise to large verdicts, finally sustained on appeal. In White v. Kretz Bros.,
2 1
defendant's truck was being driven in the middle of the paved road, up a
hill, leaving only about three feet of the left side of the road vacant. Plain-
tiffs, husband and wife, were driving from the other direction, remaining
on the right side of the road, and going at the rate of about thirty-five miles
per hour. Plaintiffs, without fault, collided with defendant's truck. The
husband's breastbone was fractured, and the wife suffered a fracture of the
jaw, causing permanent injury. Both plaintiffs were forty-eight years old.
A verdict for $2oo6o was held not excessive. It may well be said that
defendants were guilty of reckless misconduct in occupying a portion of the
left side of the road while approaching the top of the hill. The facts stated
in the report do not indicate that either plaintiff was injured in such a way
as to produce permanent incapacity to follow their usual pursuits, although
their injuries were somewhat severe and painful. Perhaps the fact that
such an unusually large verdict was sustained, for such injuries, indicates
that the court was influenced by the very reprehensible nature of defendant's
conduct.
22
An able seaman sustained injuries, including permanent maiming of
one arm and shortening and stiffening of one leg, probable impairment of the
use of a knee, pain and suffering, and loss of earnings. He was awarded
$28,541. This case seems one of the clearest cases of reckless misconduct.
Plaintiff was ordered by defendant into the rigging of an unseaworthy ship,
and, while plaintiff was there, dynamite was discharged into the masts of the
ship, breaking and toppling the masts, striking the yardarm and rigging
where plaintiff was, and causing plaintiff to fall to the deck below.
23
io P. (2d) 198 (Cal. App. 1932).
SA case containing circumstances combining to make as serious an instance of reck-
less misconduct as is found among those involving motor cars on highways is Lincoln v.
Stone, 42 S. W. (-d) 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), in which plaintiff, a 26-year-old trained
nurse, suffered permanent disabilities, disfigurement, fractured clavicle and jaw, pain and
suffering, and impairment of ability to work at her occupation. Judgment on a verdict for
.52o,ooo was affirmed. The collision causing these injuries was between an automobile, in
which plaintiff was riding as a guest, and a truck of defendant, which was being driven on
the road at night, without a tail-light, without a red flag to the rear, without a driver's cab,
and with timbers projecting at the sides and real-. Together, the facts indicate a low
degree of visibility and a great capacity for harm. It seems that it can fairly be said that
the combined facts of the case indicate reckless misconduct.
In Hughes v. Mississippi River & B. T. Ry., 309 Mo. 56o, 274 S. W. 703 (1925),
plaintiff was injured in a collision produced by the failure of the driver of one of defendant's
motor cars to give warning of approach at a dangerous curve, where the rules of defendant
demanded that such warning be given. Plaintiff, a section hand, with a life expectancy of
3232 years, was rendered a complete.and permanent physical wreck, with pain and suffering
continuing two years after the accident. A verdict for $21,168 was held not excessive. The
case seems to be one of reckless misconduct.
'In re Famous Players Lasky Corporation, 30 F. (2d) 402 (S. D. Cal. 1929). In
Becker S. S. Co. v. Snyder, 31 Ohio App. 379, i66 N. E. 645 (1929), because of the gross
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Those familiar with the operation of coal mines know that the geologi-
cal formation and the removal of large areas of coal often bring about a
condition in which every intelligent person concerned in the working of the
mine understands the very great danger of a cave-in of the roof of the
mine, with a consequent crushing of miners, if the roof is not well supported
by caps and props. In Starck v. Washington Union Coal Co.,24 plaintiff,
an employee in defendant's mine, was injured by a cave-in of the roof,
through lack of props. Defendant had complained of the dangerous roof;
but the foreman, on inspection, declared it safe, and yet promised to furnish
props. A verdict for $20,000 was upheld. A considerable chance of injury
to plaintiff must have been consciously taken by defendant's foreman. This
too may properly be termed a case of reckless misconduct.
In Bourke v. Butte Electric & Power Co.,2' damage to plaintiff's per-
son resulted from failure of defendant to keep its electric wires insulated at
a point where they ran over a tramway trestle to a mine where plaintiff
worked. "Criminal disregard of the rights and safety of all persons" was
alleged, and it would seem that the case may properly be treated as one
of reckless misconduct. We have no statement in the opinion as to whether
the large verdict allowed to stand was entirely compensatory damages, as
exemplary damages were also claimed.
Another instance of a large verdict, which was upheld on appeal, is
Bowman-Hicks Lumber Co. v. Robinson,26 wherein plaintiff, a decker in a
logging camp, was injured when an unusually large log became disengaged
from its decker hook and rolled against a tree, which fell against plaintiff,
fracturing his skull and causing other serious injuries. The report of the
case gives no statement indicating the final results of plaintiff's injuries or
the value of his earning power. A verdict for $30,000 was upheld. The
defendant apparently had violated its duty to plaintiff in a number of ways
and had consciously taken the chance of causing just such an injury. It
seems to be a case of reckless misconduct.
In Decatur Cotton Seed Oil Co. v. Belew, 27 a very large verdict was
allowed to stand, where defendant's building collapsed upon plaintiff and
injured him very seriously. There is much reason to say that this was a
case of reckless misconduct.
Recklessness in the handling of gasoline near fire caused the serious
injuries complained of in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Snell,28 and a verdict
negligence or reckless misconduct of the defendant in failing to wash down the deck of its
ship, dirty and slippery from water and oil, plaintiff, a seaman, about 18 years of age,
fell into a hatch and down into the hold, breaking his back, arm, and leg, being permanently
crippled. A verdict for $2oooo was held not excessive.
'6I Wash. 213, 112 Pac. 235 (191o).
-33 Mont. 267, 83 Pac. 47o (19o5).
16 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
27178 S. W. 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
m47 Tex. Civ. App. 413, 1O6 S. W. 170 (1907).
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for $30,000 was upheld. In Thirkell v. Equitable Gas Co.,29 plaintiff, as
the result of an explosion of defendant's gas main, suffered injuries of the
spine and chest, loss of voice, the death of his wife, and the loss of $2ooo
in personal property. A verdict for $50,845.50 was held excesive by only
$17,47o.50. Plaintiff was a labor foreman, aged forty-six, and earning
$17o a month. The facts as to this explosion, as reported in King v. Equita-
ble Gas Co.,3 0 indicate gross neglect amounting to reckless misconduct, de-
fendant's own evidence showing that it had not sufficiently cared for the
gas main for years previous to the time of the catastrophe.
A case in which the verdict, even as finally reduced, was very large, is
Vaughan v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry.,31 in which an
assistant yardmaster, earning $225 a month, suffered amputation of his right
arm between elbow and shoulder, a skull fracture, impairing his hearing
for some time, and causing large expenditures for medical treatment; but
he was not permanently disabled physically from earning a livelihood. His
age was forty-one, and his life expectancy was 26.76 years. A verdict
for $50,000 was reduced to $25,000. This is seemingly a case of reckless
misconduct, as there was apparently a conscious violation, by defendant, of
an important and well known rule, and the violation submitted plaintiff to a
very great hazard, of which defendant must have consciously taken the
chance.
An unusually large verdict was upheld in Lamar v. Collins,32 in which
plaintiff, a household maid, sustained fractures of a cheek-bone, jaw-bone,
and arm. The arm injury caused several operations and was permanent.
She underwent extreme pain over a long period, and expenses were heavy.
Judgment on a verdict for $35,000 was affirmed. The court's finding indi-
cates reckless misconduct.
In Whittington v. Westport Hotel ,Operating Co.,33 plaintiff, a twenty-
three-year-old carpenter, suffered permanent injury, causing inverted foot
and injury to sacroiliac joint, concussion of the brain and spine, and suffer-
ing. A verdict for $20,000 was held not excessive. Reckless misconduct
seems to have caused the injury.
The twenty-eight decisions just recounted, all allowing verdicts to stand
at $20,000 or more, seem, in every instance, to be founded upon acts amount-
ing to reckless misconduct. Of these decisions, several allow very large
damages, where the facts stated indicate only moderate damage.
23o7 Pa. 377, i61 Atl. 313 (1932).
c307 Pa. 287, i6i At. 65 (1932).
213z- Mo. 139, i8 S. W. (2d) 62 (i929).
w252 Ill. App. 238 (i929).
326 Mo. 1117, 33 S. W. (2d) 963 (I93O). See also McAuliffe v. New York, etc.
R. R., 172 App. Div. 597, 158 N. Y. Supp. g22 (1916), in which, in a case of obvious reckless
misconduct, the verdict was reduced from $4oo0o to $25,o0o.
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We shall now examine some cases in which judgments for $20,000
or more were permitted to stand, in instances wherein probably no more than
mere negligence appears.
In Smith v. Acme Boiler & Tank Co.,34 plaintiff, a thirty-six-year-old
boiler-maker, earning $37.40 weekly, was rendered a helpless cripple. A
verdict for $2o,ooo was held not excessive. The facts seem to indicate mere
negligence.
Plaintiff, an unmarried woman, twenty-four years old, in Hepner v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby,35 complained of leg bums, head injuries, brain con-
cussion, fractured rib, hernia, neurosis, and other injuries received in a
collision brought about by defendant's negligence. A verdict for $27,500,
reduced by the trial court from $4o,ooo, was sustained. The facts seem
to have shown no more than. negligence.
In Haaga v. Saginaw Logging Co.,36 plaintiff was struck and injured
while crossing the railroad track of defendant at a grade crossing in an
automobile as a guest of the driver. The conduct of defendant's servant
was apparently no more than negligent. Plaintiff, twenty-one years old, was
earning $13o a month. The injuries caused practically a total loss of earn-
ing capacity, permanent suffering, and inconvenience in manner of living.
A verdict for $40,000 was held not excessive. Plaintiff's injuries were
unusually severe, he was young, and his injuries would presumably affect
him for many years. It is one of those cases in which the damage is so
great that, of whatever type the blameworthy conduct may have been, it is
very hard to say that $4o,ooo should be held excessive. Yet probably there
are courts that would have been inclined to reduce so large a verdict for
merely negligent conduct.
In Shaw v. Boston, etc. Railroad Corp.,3" a verdict for $22,500 was
upheld, where the facts indicated only negligence, but the personal injuries
proved were very severe.
Plaintiff in Galveston, etc. Ry. v. Cherry,3 8 a locomotive engineer on
defendant's train, fell and was very seriously injured, by reason of a loose,
defective, and insecurely fastened engine step. A verdict for $20,000 was
upheld. The case was treated by the court as one of negligence, and it is
such a case, unless one could call the operation of a locomotive without
inspection of its step reckless misconduct. On the whole, it seems only a
case of negligence.
In Murphy v. Pacific T. & T. Co., 9 plaintiff was badly injured by the
fall of a telephone pole on which he was working and an adjoining pole, the
Ua326 MO. 734, 32 S. W. (2d) 576 (193o).
33oo Pac. 830 (Cal. App. 1931).
165 Wash. 367, 5 P. (2d) 505 (931).
,8 Gray 45 (Mass. 1857).
'44 Tex. Civ. App. 344, 98 S. W. 898 (197).
'68 Wash. 643, 124 Pac. 114 (1912).
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poles not being rendered safe and stable with guys. The foreman had guyed
all poles that he considered dangerous. This seems to be a case of mere
negligence. A verdict for $20,000 was upheld.
In Brackett v. James Black Masonry & Contracting Co.,40 defendant
negligently constructed a scaffold, on which another employee of defendant
worked above plaintiff, and from which he fell upon plaintiff, breaking
plaintiff's neck, with injury to the brain and spinal cord and complete inca-
pacity to work thereafter. Plaintiff was thirty-three years old and was
earning about $iooo a year. A verdict for $22,5oo, reduced from $30,000,
was held not excessive. Probably negligence only is involved.
Rose v. Missouri District Telegraph Co. 41 was a case in which plaintiff,
while working on a telegraph pole, fell forty-two feet to a pavement, as a
result of the defective condition of a cross-arm. He was thirty-one years
old, and was rendered a helpless invalid, unable to work, and condemned
to a life of suffering and misery. He lost the sight of one eye completely,
and the vision of the other eye was greatly impaired. His right leg was
rendered useless, and, in order to go around at all, he was forced to use a
brace and crutches. He suffered a serious fracture of the skull. His sep-
tum was so pushed over as to interfere with his breathing. His hearing
was reduced to about one-fourth of normal. His shoulder was badly in-
jured. The left side of his body was rendered numb, with partial paralysis.
His memory was impaired, he was rendered nervous, and would be likely
to continue to suffer. The verdict for $50,000 was held excessive by
$io,ooo. The conduct of the defendant was probably only negligent, but
the injuries were unusually severe.
Plaintiff, in Woods v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry.,
42
was a twenty-seven-year-old switchman earning $200 per month. He suf-
fered injuries resulting in permanent stiffening of the right arm, and ampu-
tation of a leg five inches below the knee. He was incapacitated for eight
months, and could rarely put in a full day of work thereafter. A verdict
for $30,000 was held not excessive. The injuries resulted from the break-
ing of a brake-wheel. This seems a case of negligence only.
In Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,43 plaintiff, a railway postal
clerk, earning $2300 per year, suffered fractured bones of shoulder, left
hip, and right ankle, resulting in permanent disability, and also injuries to
ear and eye. Judgment on a verdict for $85,00o was affirmed, on condition
of remittitur of $50,000. The case seems one of mere negligence.
In the ten cases just examined, in which verdicts for $20,000 or more
were upheld in what seem to be cases of mere negligence, in every instance,
40326 Mo. 387, 32 S. W. (2zd) 288 (193o).
"328 Mo. 1009, 43 S. W. (2d) 562 (1931).
18 S. W. (2d) 922 (Mo. 1928).
4288 S. W. 777 (Mo. 1926).
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the injuries were unusually severe, destroying or almost destroying the earn-
ing capacity of the plaintiff, and, in several instances, rendering him a help-
less cripple.
We shall next examine some cases in which verdicts for $20,000 or
more have been upheld, where the reported facts leave in serious doubt the
question whether defendant's conduct amounted to reckless misconduct or to
mere negligence.
In Skinner v. Davis,44 plaintiff, a young man of twenty-one, was so
injured that one leg was shortened and atrophied, his nervous system shocked
and deranged, and he was incapacitated to perform manual labor. A verdict
for $20,000 was held not excessive. Whether there was reckless misconduct
in producing the collision in which plaintiff was injured, we cannot ascertain
from the facts reported.
In Adskirn v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co.,4' plaintiff, a brakeman,
suing under the federal employers' liability act, was injured when, in the
darkness, he alighted on a pile of cinders and gravel placed between the
tracks by defendant's employees. The facts in the case seem to indicate
that defendant's employees knew that to leave such a pile between tracks
presented a serious hazard of exactly the kind of injury that did occur;
but, from the facts stated in the reports, we cannot learn with satisfactory
certainty whether this was so. Plaintiff was thirty-eight years old, with life
expectancy of 29.62 years, and earned $250 a month. He suffered serious
and permanent injury to the spine. A verdict for $23,256.50 was held not
excessive.
In re Central Railroad of New Jersey 4" was a case in which a verdict
for $30,000 for personal injuries to a forty-nine-year-old woman, with an
expectancy of life of over twenty years, for personal injuries and conse-
quent loss of business amounting to $3500 per year, was held not excessive,
the court saying that, if anything, the sum was too low. The case says
nothing about the facts constituting the defendant's fault in the collision
causing the injuries.
H. L. Hunt, Inc. v. Frisby 47 was a case in which defendant caused
serious and permanently incapacitating injuries by negligently engaging a
clutch. The facts stated are meager, but the case is probably one of negli-
gence only. Damages were reduced from $25,000 to $20,000. Plaintiff
was caused apparently permanent pain.
The plaintiff, a brakeman, in Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Remel,4 s
in the performance of his duties, was riding on the last car, to protect the
"4312 Mo. 58I, 280 S. W. 37 (1926).
"134 Ore. 574, 294 Pac. 605 (1930).
4652 F. (2d) 2o (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
7 51 S. W. (2d) 516 (Ark. 1932).4848 S. W. (2d) 548 (Ark. 1932).
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train as it backed into a switch. Seeking damages under the federal em-
ployers' liability act, he alleged that because of the negligence of the engi-
neer in stopping the train in an unusual and violent manner, plaintiff was
thrown from the car to the ground and so injured that he would never again
be able to do manual labor. The verdict for $6o,ooo was reduced to
$40,000. Plaintiff was thirty-nine years old, earning $250 a month. He
sustained serious injuries to the spine, the first lumbar vertebra being
crushed and the spinal cord pinched. He would probably suffer pain for
the rest of his life and would gradually grow worse. This seems to be a
case of mere negligence, and even the fact of negligence was seriously dis-
puted by the defendant; but there is some reason to classify this case as in
the doubtful zone between negligence and recklessness, inasmuch as the
likelihood of such injuries from a violent stopping of a train is great, and
it may be plausibly argued that the engineer, in so stopping, is consciously
taking a serious chance of causing severe injuries to persons on board the
train.
Masonite Corporation v. Lochridge 49 was a case in which plaintiff, an
employee of defendant, was injured by a shock received from an electric
machine, which had not been inspected by defendant before being turned
over to plaintiff for operation. For safety the machine should have been
inspected and grounded. Plaintiff's earning capacity was practically de-
stroyed. He was forty-one years old, and had been earning $7.50 per day.
It was held that a verdict for $20,000 was not excessive. From the few
facts given, it is impossible to say whether the omission of inspection and
grounding occurred under such circumstances as to make it amount to reck-
less misconduct.
In Hommell v. Errington,50 plaintiff, a lawyer, was injured by the com-
bined negligence of a driver in whose automobile he was a guest and of the
driver of a truck, with which a collision occurred. From the report of the
case, it is doubtful whether the defendant trucking company was guilty of
more than negligence, although there was some evidence that their truck
entered the road from another road at thirty-five miles an hour. Plaintiff's
injuries included injuries to the brain, fracture of pelvic bones and of the
two bones below the pubis, severe injury to urinary system, loss of some
teeth, partial impairment of memory and of hearing. He was confined
to a hospital bed, in a strait-jacket, for five weeks, and thereafter for some
months was confined to a bed in his father's home. His recovery remained
uncertain. No information is given, by the report, as to plaintiff's age or
earning capacity. A verdict for $25,000 was sustained.
Plaintiff, a married woman, thirty-nine years old, was run down in the
street by an automobile belonging to defendant. The report indicates noth-
to 140 So. 223 (Miss. 1932).
io N. J. Misc. 93, 157 AtI. 673 (1932).
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ing as to the nature of defendant's conduct. Plaintiff was rendered a
physical wreck for life. A verdict for $26,000 was sustained in Sanford v.
Totty Co.5
In Sellers v. Wood Hydraulic Hoist & Body Co.,62 plaintiff, a woman
fifty years old, who had been conducting a profitable business before her
injury, suffered the following elements of damage: fractured skull rendering
her unconscious and irrational for weeks, the necessity of a guardian and
constant attendant even at the time of the trial, seven months after the
injury, probably permanent inability to resume any employment requiring
concentration, broken bones in right hand, teeth in lower jaw so loosened
as to require extraction, and $2500 for medical attention. A verdict for
$20,000 was held not excessive. From the few facts stated, it is impossible
to say whether the defendant was guilty of reckless misconduct.
In the nine cases just examined, more or less doubtful cases on the
point of negligence or of reckless misconduct, in every instance the damages
were very great, and probably in every case there was a permanent incapacity
to do work as the plaintiff had done work before the injuries. This inca-
pacity seems to have been total or nearly so in every case.
We shall now examine cases in which the defendant has seemed guilty
of no more than negligence, where verdicts have been reduced from $20,000
or more to figures under $20,000 or have been set aside as being excessive.
In Mitchell v. Tacoma Ry. & Motor Co.,5 3 a verdict of $30,000 for the
negligent striking of plaintiff by defendant's street car was reduced to
$12,000.
In Renne v. United States Leather Co.,54 plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old
boy, sued for personal injuries sustained while in the employ of defendant
and riding on top of a freight car for the purpose of setting the brake thereon.
While the car was being backed into the yards, plaintiff was swept off the
top by an exhaust pipe extending horizontally from defendant's boiler house,
over its side tracks. If the car had not happened to be much higher than
the other cars in common use at the place, the accident probably would not
have occurred. In placing the exhaust pipe, the defendants do not seem to
158 Atl. 99 (N. J. 1932).
U2o5 Cal. 519, 271 Pac. io55 (1928). See Missouri, etc. Ry. v. Smith, 172 S. W. 750
(Tex. Civ. App. I915), in which the verdict was reduced from $5oooo to $3oooo. Although
the verdict was very large, even as reduced, it seems to be grounded entirely in the great
amount of damage actually done, for the case appears to be one of negligence.
See also St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 114 Ark. 224, I69 S. W. 822 (914), in which
the circumstances seem to point to mere negligence. The judgment was reduced from
$38,ooo to $2o,ooo.
A somewhat similar case is Strand v. Great Northern Ry., ioI Minn. 85, iii N. W.
958, 112 N. W. 987 (i9o7), in which plaintiff, a fireman, was badly injured by the explosion
of a locomotive boiler. There was some evidence of contributory negligence of plaintiff.
Evidence on the question of defendant's negligence was conflicting. It seems that there is
no indication of reckless misconduct. A verdict of $3o,00o was reduced to $20,000.
13 Wash. 560, 43 Pac. 528 (1896).
U io7 Wis. 305, 83 N. W. 473 (IO).
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have been consciously taking a chance of doing harm to any one. The case
seems to be one of mere negligence. The injuries to plaintiff were very
severe. The plaintiff was put his choice of a remittitur of all damages in
excess of $12,ooo or a reversal.
Amsdill v. Detroit Motorbus Co." is a case in which plaintiff, a pas-
senger, was thrown down a stairway on a bus, by a sudden starting. She
was a married woman, and made no claim for diminution of earning power.
A verdict for $25,000 was reduced to $15,ooo. From the facts it is not
entirely clear whether there was negligence or reckless misconduct; but, when
one considers the plan of the modern double-deck bus and the ordinary
method of its operation, it would seem likely that this is a case of mere
negligence.
In Hoag v. Washington-Oregon Corporation,6 while plaintiff, a line-
man, was engaged in tying a wire to an insulator, the electric current was
turned into the wires without warning. Negligence was alleged, for turning
on the current in this manner and also for the method of placing and insulat-
ing wires. The facts, as indicated in the report, do not clearly indicate
whether there was reckless misconduct or mere negligence; but it seems
to have been considered merely a case of negligence. The verdict was
reduced from $30,000 to $14,000.
Koch v. Southern Cities Distributing Co.57 was a case in which plaintiff
was injured by a gas explosion caused by defendant's negligence. At the
time of injury, he was thirty-eight years old and earning $250 per month.
Defendant seems to have taken no risk consciously. Plaintiff suffered
lacerations, contusions, bruises, a broken nose and foot, and was rendered
a nervous wreck. A verdict for $35,995 was reduced to $15,995.
In Sallee v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,58 plaintiff was so injured that
one leg was amputated below the knee, and there was some brain injury. He
was a fifty-five-year-old switchman, earning $275 to $300 per month. It
seemed to be a case of mere negligence in maintenance of hand brakes. The
verdict was reduced from $30,000 to $17,000.
In the six negligence cases just examined, verdicts were reduced from
amounts equal to or exceeding $20,000 to amounts less than $20,000. In
some of these cases, in view of the very great harm done to the person of
the plaintiff, the defendant might regard himself as fortunate in obtaining
any reduction in the amount of the judgment at all. It certainly seems that
in Koch v. Southern Cities Distributing Co., and Sallee v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., the courts dealt mercifully with merely negligent defendants.
=233 Mich. 150, 206 N. W. 494 (1925).
t75 Ore. 588, 144 Pac. 574, 147 Pac. 756 (1914).
Sx8 La. App. 664, 138 So. 178 (1930.
c321 Mo. 798, 12 S. W. (2d) 476 (1928).
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On the other hand, where a verdict is reduced in a reckless misconduct
case, the excessiveness, it seems, has to be much clearer than has been required
in some of the negligence cases and probably somewhat clearer than has been
required in any of them. Decisions granting a reversal for excessive dam-
ages or ordering a remittitur, in the reckless misconduct cases, are ordinarily
cases in which it could be said, almost at a glance, that the damages were
grossly excessive. A fair example of this kind is Yazoo, etc. Ry. v. Cobb,"
in which plaintiff was injured in a collision caused by the failure of defend-
ant's telegraph operator to deliver properly a train order to the conductor
of a train. The operator placed the message containing the order upon a
table in front of the conductor when he called for orders, instead of deliver-
it to him and having him read it aloud as required by the rules of the com-
pany, and the conductor failed to take the orders with him when he left.
The court said in another case based on the same facts, Yazoo, etc. Ry. v.
Farr,60 "We have no doubt that the operator was gravely delinquent in the
discharge of duty." When one studies the two cases carefully, it seems that
the conduct of the operator and of the conductor may well be denominated
reckless. But the verdict for $25,000 was very clearly and grossly excessive.
The court said, "We think the injury is not such as will cause permanent
disability." The reduction of the judgment from $25,00o to $12,500 left
the plaintiff a sum that is unusually large for damage not producing any
permanent disability.
It seems easier to get large verdicts set aside in cases of personal injur-
ies arising from negligence than in the cases of such injuries arising from
reckless misconduct.
in cases of wilful injury to another's business, by means of unfair
trade practices in violation of the common law 31 or in violation of an anti-
C994 Miss. 561, 48 So. 522 (I9op). Louisville, etc. R. R. v. Long, 94 Ky. 410, 22 S. W.
747 (1893), is a clear case of reckless misconduct. Plaintiff, a passenger, was severely
injured by the collision of a freight train with the passenger car, the crew having left the
passenger car on the main track without flagging the approaching train. But the $26,ooo
verdict, which was set aside, was clearly excessive. Likewise, an apparently grossly ex-
cessive verdict for $25,000 was reduced to $5,ooo in Peyton v. Texas & P. Ry., 41 La. Ann.
861, 6 So. 69o (1889), which seems to be a reckless misconduct case.
In Alabama Power Co. v. Goodwin, 214 Ala. 15, io6 So. 239 (1925), plaintiff, a
53-year-old married woman, while a passenger in defendant's street car, was injured through
what seems to have been "wanton negligence", or "reckless misconduct", on the part of
defendant's motorman, though the facts stated in the report above cited and in 21o Ala. 657,
99 So. 158 (924), and in the report of the case brought by the husband for the same
injuries to his wife, this plaintiff, 21o Ala. 388, 98 So. 124 (923), are very meager. A ver-
dict for $2oooo was held excessive by $6,500. But it is to be noticed that her expenses of
treatment and illness had been paid for by defendant. It seemed improbable that she would
continue to suffer for life to any considerable degree. When this fact is considered, the
amount finally allowed seems liberal.
W'94 Miss. 557, 559, 48 So. 520, 521 (og).
Defendant, by defamation and other unfair trade practices, attempted to destroy the
business of plaintiff, and actually did large damage. There was evidence of damage to the
amount of $30,000 per year. Damages were assessed in the sum of $IOOooo. Judgment
was affirmed. Lion Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 252 Ill. App. 92 (I929). See also
Morand Bros., Inc. v. Chippewa Springs Corp., 2 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924),
certiorari denied, 267 U. S. 592, 45 Sup. Ct. 229 (1925).
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trust statute, 2 or by means of infringement of patents, 3 the courts will
more readily allow large verdicts to stand than in cases where the defendant
has innocently made use of the principle of plaintiff's patent or has otherwise
innocently done a wrong to plaintiff's business. Undoubtedly one factor
that makes fdr liberality in allowing damages in many of these cases is the
uncertainty of damage caused by the acts of defendant. The very acts of
the defendant, in some instances, have produced the uncertainty. Many of
the cases are such that the plaintiff can present no evidence of certain damage,
excepting a few instances of injury to his business and of a widespread
indulgence by defendant in his wrongful practices.
Any study of the tendencies of courts in this field is beset with great
difficulties. In many cases, it is impossible to weigh with any accuracy
the elements of actual damage to the plaintiff, and, in a considerable number
of the cases, it is difficult to learn much about the degree of fault of the
defendant or even with any reasonable certainty to classify his conduct as
negligent or as reckless; but, on the whole, this much stands out with a fair
degree of clearness: a high degree of fault in the defendant makes more
likely the affirmance of judgment on a very large verdict, even for com-
pensatory damages alone, and will result in a less thorough scrutiny by the
court of facts affecting the solution of the question of excessiveness of
damages. On the other hand, a lower degree of fault in the defendant causes
the court to examine more closely all of the facts bearing upon excessiveness
of damages, and to be more willing to reverse for excessiveness.
See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 51 Sup.
Ct. 248 (I93I); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359, 47
Sup. Ct. 400 (1927).
' "All doubts should be resolved in complainant's favor, for the infringement has been
declared by this court to have been deliberate." Coffield Motor Washer Co. v. Wayne Mfg.
Co., 255 Fed. 58, at 56o (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
